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Abstract
Social cognition in infancy is evident in coordinated triadic engagements, that is, infants attending jointly with social partners
and objects. Current evolutionary theories of primate social cognition tend to highlight species differences in cognition based on
human-unique cooperative motives. We consider a developmental model in which engagement experiences produce differential
outcomes. We conducted a 10-year-long study in which two groups of laboratory-raised chimpanzee infants were given
quantifiably different engagement experiences. Joint attention, cooperativeness, affect, and different levels of cognition were
measured in 5- to 12-month-old chimpanzees, and compared to outcomes derived from a normative human database. We found
that joint attention skills significantly improved across development for all infants, but by 12 months, the humans significantly
surpassed the chimpanzees. We found that cooperativeness was stable in the humans, but by 12 months, the chimpanzee group
given enriched engagement experiences significantly surpassed the humans. Past engagement experiences and concurrent affect
were significant unique predictors of both joint attention and cooperativeness in 5- to 12-month-old chimpanzees. When
engagement experiences and concurrent affect were statistically controlled, joint attention and cooperation were not associated.
We explain differential social cognition outcomes in terms of the significant influences of previous engagement experiences and
affect, in addition to cognition. Our study highlights developmental processes that underpin the emergence of social cognition in
support of evolutionary continuity.
Research highlights
• Two types of social cognition, joint attention and
cooperation, develop in chimpanzees in the first yearof
life.
• Previous engagement experiences and concurrent
affect are major proximate mechanisms for social
cognition outcomes in young chimpanzees.
• Cognition plays an important role for joint attention,
especially at younger ages, but not for cooperation.
• Cooperation and other triadic skills are not proxi-
mate mechanisms for joint attention skills, above and
beyond engagement experiences and affect.
• Important developmental processes apply to social
cognition in chimpanzees, supporting evolutionary
continuity among hominoids.
Introduction
Joint attention (JA), infants’ triadic ability to engage
with social partners about objects or events in the world
(Bakeman & Adamson, 1984), emerges between 9 and
12 months of age in humans, and marks the onset of
shared intentionality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne
& Moll, 2005). Current formulations of the Shared
Intentionality model assume that social cognition is built
upon the cognitive construct of the psychological
understanding of other minds, and further claim that
joint attention relies on uniquely human cooperative
motives, and that the capacity to engage jointly with
another is a biological adaptation unique to humans
(Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg & Tomasello, 2011;
Tomasello & Moll, 2010). Here we propose the Lived
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Experiences model of social cognition to be applied to
nonhuman, as well as human, primates. This model is
based on the ontogeny of human social cognition as
empirically documented by developmental and compar-
ative psychologists (e.g. Adamson & Bakeman, 1985;
Tomasello et al., 2005) and focuses on the proximate
processes by which infants develop engagement with
persons and engagement with objects, and coordinate
these engagements in the phenotypic expressions of
cooperation and joint attention. The Lived Experiences
model predicts different phenotypic outcomes in primate
social cognition (Bard & Leavens, 2009; Jablonka &
Lamb, 2007; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933; Leavens & Bard,
2011), based on social learning mechanisms that are
simple or complex (Meltzoff, Kuhl, Movellan & Sejnow-
ski, 2009; Moore & Corkum, 1994; Papousek, 2007;
Rumbaugh, King, Beran, Washburn & Gould, 2007;
Roseberry, Richie, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff & Shipley,
2011) and may depend on affect (Adamson & Bakeman,
1985; Deak, Triesch, Krasno, de Barbaro & Robledo,
2013; Panksepp, 2011; Syal & Finlay, 2011). With the
application of this developmental model, we explain how
nonhuman primate social cognition develops through
interactional experiences with social partners, living
within particular eco-cultural settings (Bakeman,
Adamson, Konner & Barr, 1990; Hewlett, Fouts, Boyette
& Hewlett, 2011; Keller, 2007; Racine & Carpendale,
2007), by highlighting the constructs of affect and
previous engagement experiences, in addition to cogni-
tion (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985; Trevarthen & Aitken,
2001). This model is empirically derived from prototypic
human development and here is applied for the first time
to chimpanzee development of joint attention and
cooperation.
With the Lived Experiences model, we embrace
developmental principles for social cognition outcomes
that are achieved with rapid learning, without explicit
teaching, based on actual experiences, and that both
contribute to and result from neural connectivity net-
works (Bard, 1994; Panksepp, 2011; Syal & Finlay, 2011;
Striano & Reid, 2009). Of course, cognition depends on
supportive neural structures, but we know that neural
structures develop in interaction with environmental
influences (Fox, Levitt & Nelson, 2010). We suggest that
the learning processes involved in the early development
of social cognition among hominoids (apes and humans)
are based on largely shared evolutionary mechanisms
(e.g. Bard, 2009; Gardner, 2005; Jablonka & Lamb,
2007).
The Lived Experiences model predicts different social
cognition outcomes for chimpanzees that live in different
ecological and social settings. Cross-species studies
of social cognition have not typically controlled for
postnatal experiences (e.g. age at testing, past learning
experiences, or quality of rearing/engagement experi-
ences; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Hamann et al., 2011;
Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare & Tomasello,
2007; Povinelli & Eddy, 1996; Tomasello & Carpenter,
2005). When the social cognition of young (family-
raised) humans is compared with adult (laboratory-
raised) chimpanzees, differences cannot be logically
attributed solely to species, as species is confounded
with duration (and quality) of postnatal experiences
(Bard & Leavens, 2009; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933;
Leavens & Bard, 2011; Leavens, Bard & Hopkins,
2010; Leavens, Hopkins & Bard, 2005). This problem
might be trivial if, in apes, postnatal experiences did not
impact social cognition. However, ape-language and
cross-fostering projects provide irrefutable evidence of
the significant impact of lived experiences on cognitive
outcomes in apes; e.g. some chimpanzees learn symbol
systems (Fouts, 1997; Gardner, Gardner & Van
Cantford, 1989; Premack, 1976; Rumbaugh, 1977;
Savage-Rumbaugh, Murphy, Sevcik, Brakke, Williams
& Rumbaugh, 1993), and enculturated adult apes
perform significantly better than laboratory-raised apes
in tests of both social cognition and physical cognition
(Bania, Harris, Kinsley & Boysen, 2009; Furlong, Boose
& Boysen, 2008; Lyn, Russell & Hopkins, 2010; Russell,
Lyn, Schaeffer & Hopkins, 2011). Postnatal experiences
in apes have been linked with differential outcomes that
rely on joint attention, such as pointing (Leavens &
Bard, 2011; Lyn et al., 2010; Leavens et al., 2010;
Gardner et al., 1989), imitation, and emulation
(Bjorklund, 2006; Furlong et al., 2008; Gardner, 2005;
Rumbaugh, Washburn, King, Beran, Gould &
Savage-Rumbaugh, 2008; Russell et al., 2011; Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1993). Common processes have been
proposed to explain developmental changes, e.g. point-
ing emerges in human infants and in some apes as a
solution within the Referential Problem Space (Leavens
et al., 2005), the environmental circumstance in which an
organism is reliant on others to act on the world for them
(e.g. babies in a crib, older apes in a cage).
Conceptualizations of early social cognition in
humans include a range of skills involving joint attention
(JA) and cooperation. Initial reports of JA skills focused
on overt behaviors such as infants’ abilities to follow the
gaze, head orientation, and pointing of adults, and
infants’ coordinated joint engagements with social part-
ners and objects (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Adamson
& Bakeman, 1985; Corkum & Moore, 1995). More
recently, research on JA skills has shifted to focus on
underlying psychological motivations, such as infants’
communicative intentions (e.g. declarative, imperative,
informative; Leavens & Bard, 2011), or infants’
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motivations for engagement (Tomasello et al., 2005;
Tomasello & Moll, 2010; Hamann et al., 2011). To be
useful in comparative research, however, constructs must
include overt behaviors, i.e. operational definitions. Skill
sets based on theoretical constructs alone, without
corresponding behavioral anchors, are particularly prob-
lematic (Butterfill, 2012; Leavens & Bard, 2011; Racine
& Carpendale, 2007). For example, a mental state is
often discussed as something tangible that can be shared
with others. It is only when such constructs are defined
with behavioral markers, observed and measured, that
they can be determined to be manifest in human or
nonhuman primates (Deak et al., 2013; Leavens,
Hopkins & Bard, 2008).
Our focus in this paper is the emergence and devel-
opment of JA and cooperation in the first year of life,
with the goal to elucidate those processes that support
the young infant’s developing social cognition. We view
these two skills globally as requiring coordinated joint
engagement, in other words, as coordinating infants’
object-related activity with that of their social partner,
especially so as to benefit from demonstrations, and
from both verbal and gestural guidance (Adamson &
Bakeman, 1985; Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). We use a
behavioral measure of cooperation, defined as the ‘give
and take’ activity commonly observed in pre- and non-
verbal infants (e.g. Adamson & Bakeman, 1985; Toma-
sello & Moll, 2010). Whereas the topic of JA is typically
the object (e.g. how to act on the object), the topic of
cooperation is more about the social activity (the social
exchange, the activity of passing back and forth between
social partners; e.g. Bakeman et al., 1990; Bayley, 1969).
Developmental researchers, from 1960 through the
1980s, routinely found that cooperativeness was an
important index of the infant’s involvement with test
taking, which, in turn, influenced cognitive performances
(Meisels, Cross & Plunkett, 1987).
Since we take a developmental perspective, we hypoth-
esize that both JA and cooperation are grounded in
foundational domains, including previous experience,
affect, and cognitively important dyadic skills (Adamson
& Bakeman, 1985; Tomasello et al., 2005; Trevarthen &
Aitken, 2001). We suggest that affect is critically impor-
tant, as it indicates the quality of the infant’s engagement
with the test-taking task (e.g. Bayley, 1969; Meisels et al.,
1987). For both human infants and chimpanzee infants,
testing is routinely stopped if the infants do not settle, or if
they become distressed (i.e. if they are overly fearful or
predominantly unhappy), and therefore, affect can be
considered an index of basic readiness to engage with a
test. Our study also addresses the empirical relation
between cooperation and JA, evaluating whether they are
mutually interdependent as claimed by the Shared
Intentionality model (e.g. Tomasello & Moll, 2010). To
further elucidate infants’ triadic skill sets, we assess triadic
skills involved in physical cognition (infant-object-object).
Thus, we can evaluate whether social cognition and
physical cognition develop independently (an implicit
assumption in much of comparative psychology; e.g. Call
& Tomasello, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2007).
Here we evaluate the proximate processes underlying
joint attention and cooperation by studying changes
across development, and comparing outcomes in two
groups of chimpanzees that were given systematically
different postnatal engagement experiences. Previous
studies of ape social cognition have not documented
the features of pre-experimental experiences that might
impact differential social cognitive outcomes, with the
exception of language-like skills (Lyn et al., 2010; Russell
et al., 2011). Here the chimpanzees were subjected to a
controlled manipulation of early experiences during the
first year of life and were not given any training in
artificial symbol systems. Virtually all other studies in
this domain are post-hoc comparisons of apes that have
had different rearing experiences, and are therefore
merely correlative; hence, ours is a uniquely powerful
prospective study.
The soundness of applying the Lived Experiences
model is evaluated by a comparison of social cognition
outcomes in these two groups of chimpanzee infants,
with normative profiles of human infants (Bayley, 1969),
in which we control for the amount of postnatal
experience (i.e. groups are age-matched). Our overall
strategy is to specify a model of cognitive development
grounded in normative human developmental profiles
and apply that model to a large sample of chimpanzee
infants. This Lived Experiences model of chimpanzee
social cognition will be rejected if we find (1) no within-
species differences, that is, if the two chimpanzee groups
do not differ, demonstrating that chimpanzees are
insensitive to our experimental rearing history manipu-
lation; (2) large cross-species differences, that is, pheno-
typic expressions are not comparable in chimpanzees and
humans; or (3) that social cognition in chimpanzees is
based on different developmental processes or develop-
mental patterns from those of humans.
Material and methods
Participants
The chimpanzee samples
Forty-nine chimpanzee infants, born from 1987 to
1995 at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center
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(henceforth: Yerkes Center), Emory University, were the
subjects of this study. The policy at the Yerkes Center
during this period was for all chimpanzee infants to be
raised by their biological mothers, whenever possible.
However, when females did not exhibit sufficient mater-
nal competence to ensure infant survival (Bard, 1994),
their infants were raised in the Great Ape Nursery, with
either Standard Care (ST: n = 32), or Responsive Care
(RC: n = 17) nursery regimes, where their interactional
experiences with humans differed (Bard, 1996).
The engagement histories of the chimpanzees are
quantifiable in terms of the amount, quality, and
particular types of human–chimpanzee infant interac-
tions across the two nursery rearing protocols (see
Supplementary Information [SI], for more detail). The
ratio of infants to caregivers was much lower in
Responsive Care (RC: 1 or 2 infants to 1 caregiver)
than Standard Care (ST: ~13 infants to 1 caregiver),
and RC infants spent much more time with
caregivers (300 minutes of caregiver–infant contact per
weekday) than ST infants (60 minutes of caregiver–
infant contact per day). The most important difference
was in the types of interactions (Figure 1). RC infants,
but not ST infants, experienced species-typical commu-
nicative interactions with caregivers who were trained to
interact in chimpanzee-appropriate ways (RC: 20 hrs/
week; ST: absent). For example, RC researchers spent
between 7 and 15 minutes per hour nurturing the
development of species-typical chimpanzee skills, which
compares favorably to 8.5 to 13 minutes/hour spent by
mother chimpanzees at the Yerkes Center (Figure1),
and reports from wild mother–infant interaction (van
Lawick-Goodall, 1968). ST caregivers did not spend any
time encouraging species-typical chimpanzee skills,
because they had a considerable number of other duties,
and the ST philosophy was that infants would learn
chimpanzee species-typical behavior from peers. At 4, 6,
9, and 12 months of age, RC infants experienced these
nurturing interactions significantly more often than ST
infants (all ps < .01). Note that the engagement
experiences of both nursery- and mother-raised chim-
panzee infants at the Yerkes Center were distinctly
different from those of wild chimpanzees (Boesch, 2012;
van Lawick-Goodall, 1968), of chimpanzees raised in
other biomedical laboratories (Bard, Brent, Lester,
Worobey & Suomi, 2011; Kalcher, Franz, Crailsheim
& Preuschoft, 2008), of sanctuary chimpanzees
(Ferdowsian, Durham, Kimwele, Kranendonk, Otali,
Akugizibwe, Mulcahy, Ajarova & Johnson, 2011), and
of home-raised chimpanzees (Fouts, 1997; Hayes, 1951;
Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933; Temerlin, 1976). Note that
here the chimpanzee infants did not learn any artificial
symbol systems.
The human sample
The human infants, whose data are used here, consti-
tuted the standardization sample used in the develop-
ment of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID;
Bayley, 1969). The number of infants tested at each age
varied (5 months, n = 42; 6 months, n = 57; 8 months,
n = 48; 10 months, n = 49; 12 months, n = 52). Bayley
(1969) stated that they were selected from diverse
socioeconomic backgrounds and tested with the BSID
from 1958 to 1960. The infants were predominantly
white (85%), from urban (69%) rather than rural settings,
and lived in two-parent-family homes in the USA
(100%). Data reported here were computed from Tables
12 and 17 of the manual (Bayley, 1969). Note that the
rearing experiences of these human infants were dis-
tinctly different from the experiences of human infants
from non-US cultures (e.g. Bakeman et al., 1990;
Figure 1 Infants’ experiences of engagement with caregivers’
encouragement of species-typical skills. The columns are the
rates (minutes per hour based on an 8-hour day) during which
infant chimpanzees experienced their caregiver support,
encouragement, or nurturing of species-typical development
(i.e. a summation of caregiver time spent nurturing motor
skills, nurturing social skills, nurturing communicative skills,
and nurturing general autonomy). The open columns are the
average rates for caregivers of responsive care chimpanzees (at
4 months, n = 13, at 6 months, n = 16, at 9 months, n = 17,
at 12 months, n = 16), with 99% confidence intervals. Solid
columns are the rates for chimpanzee mothers (based on a total
of 8 hours of observation), and the 0s indicate the average
rates for caregivers of standard care chimpanzees. At 6 and
12 months of age, RC infants experienced these nurturing
interactions significantly more often than mother-raised infants
(ps < .01). At 9 months, RC infants experienced nurturing as
much as mother-raised infants (p > .05), and at 4 months,
mother-raised infants experienced more nurturing than RC
infants (p < .01).
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Gaskins, 2006; Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni & Maynard,
2003; Hewlett et al., 2011; Keller, 2007) and of human
infants from orphanages (Kaler & Freeman, 1994;
Leiden Conference on the Development and Care of
Children without Permanent Parents, 2012; Rutter,
Sonuga-Barke, Beckett, Castle, Kreppner, Kumsta,
Scholtz, Stevens, Bell & Gunnar, 2010), with differential
consequences for social, cognitive, and emotional out-
comes (Fox et al., 2010; Nelson, Zeanah, Fox, Marshall,
Smyke & Guthrie, 2007).
Procedures
Bayley Scales of Infant Development
The Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID; Bayley,
1969) is the most widely used test for assessing cognitive
development of pre- and non-verbal infants. The BSID
consisted of 102 items for testing 5- to 12-month-old
human infants, and was administered to all participants
using published procedures (administration and scoring
of relevant items are described briefly in Tables S1–S4,
abstracted from Bayley, 1969). Procedures included
administration in a quiet room by a trained examiner
who was at ease with infants, beginning at a basal level
(with approximately 10 items that the infant would be
expected to pass), and stopping after approximately 10
items were failed (recorded on the MDI scoring form).
Tests lasted between 20 and 30 minutes.
Mental Development Index (MDI). The BSID results are
typically reported simply as a Mental Development
Index (MDI) score, comparable to an IQ score for older
children and adults. MDI scores are derived from tabled
values (pp. 110–115 in Bayley, 1969) computed from raw
scores (total number of BSID items passed added to the
basal value) as a function of infant age (MDI score for
the average typically developing human at each age was
standardized to 100).
Infant behavior record (IBR). Immediately after each test,
the examiner completed the IBR form (Bayley, 1969),
rating the infant’s behavior along several dimensions
according to standard criteria. IBR data were available at
all eight ages for the chimpanzees. Human IBR scores at 5,
6, 8, 10, and 12 months were computed from the data
available in Table 17 of the BSID manual (Bayley, 1969).
Administratio and reliability
Chimpanzee infants were tested by three different
examiners, each trained by the same examiner who was
an expert tester with human subjects. All examiners were
blind to the hypotheses of the current paper. An initial
examiner (VB) tested only ST infants (57 tests). The
second examiner (KG) tested both ST infants (144 tests)
and RC infants (57 tests). A third examiner (JA) tested
only RC infants (145 tests). Fifteen of 16 multivariate
ANOVAs revealed no significant or systematic differ-
ences between examiners (eight analyses between VB and
KG with testing of ST infants, all ps ns; seven analyses
between KG and JA with testing of RC infants, ps ns) in
the scoring of cooperativeness, fearfulness, and positive
emotional tone. Very good reliability on the MDI
portion of the BSID was found in comparisons between
the expert human examiner and the primary chimpanzee
examiner on raw scores (percent agreement 94%). There
were no differences in both raw scores and MDI scores
between examiners (paired t-tests, ps ns), and very high
correlations (.97, .88, ps <.001). These two types of
reliability estimates demonstrated that the chimpanzee
examiners were: (1) consistent and unbiased in the
scoring of IBR items; and (2) not different from human
examiners in the scoring of the BSID items (see SI for
more information).
Data reduction
In addition to the MDI, we derived seven additional
scores for subsequent analysis, four from the BSID, and
three from the IBR. As described below, we categorized
individual BSID items by the type of skill each required
and then assigned items to the four BSID-derived
variables, depending on the skill category. Their score
was the sum of the items passed, computed for the
chimpanzees from the BSID score sheets, and for the
humans by counting the number of items passed by
the typical infant, from 5 months to 12 months of age,
as reported by Bayley (1969; and adapted in Tables S1–
S4). Classifying items of the BSID in this way, according
to their essential skills, is unique to our study. To the best
of our knowledge, neither human nor chimpanzee BSID
data have been reported in this way previously.
Joint attention
The joint attention score was based on 30 BSID items
(see Table S1). In order to pass joint attention (JA) items,
the infant was required to coordinate attention to the
examiner (and/or her actions) with attention to the test
object(s). The specific form of the coordinated joint
engagement ranged from imitating the examiner’s
actions with a test object, to following the examiner’s
gestures and/or verbal request concerning test object
activity or the required actions with test objects. We are
confident that the JA items are valid measures of the
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skill, as they included both the coordination of attention
(demonstrated by gaze alternation between the exam-
iner’s face and the test object: see SI, Figures S7 and S8),
and the coordination of infant activity with that of the
social partner (demonstrated by passing the items;
Striano & Reid, 2009; Wieder & Greenspan, 2003).
Cooperativeness
Cooperativeness was assessed with Item 4 from the IBR.
Scores of 1 to 3 indicated that the infantmost often refused
to cooperate, scores of 4 to 6 indicated that the infant
accepted the give-and-take of objects with the examiner,
and scores of 7 to 9 indicated that the infant actively took
part in the give-and-take exchange with enjoyment.
Affect: positive emotional tone and fearfulness
Two scores that indexed affect were derived from the IBR.
What we call positive emotional tone was assessed with
Item 7, General Emotional Tone from the IBR (Figure
S1). A score of 3 indicated that the infant was unhappy at
times during the test, a score of 5 indicated general
contentment, and a score of 7 indicated that the infant was
generally happy.Fearfulnesswas assessedwith Item 5 from
the IBR (Figure S2). A score of 3 indicated that the infant
was vigilant most often during the test, a score of 5
indicated that the infant showed moderate amounts or
moderate durations of fear, and a score of 7 indicated that
the infant was frequently and/or intensely fearful.
Cognitive dyadic BSID scores
Two scores indexed dyadic skills. First, dyadic social skills
were based on eight BSID items (see Table S3). These
social items assess basic expression of emotion, basic
social responses, and basic communicative expressions,
reflective of the infant as a social being (e.g. reacting to a
social partner or reacting with social responses). Second,
simple object manipulation skills were based on 25 BSID
items. At younger ages, these items included looking at,
reaching toward, and grasping objects; by 12 months,
they included finely detailed manipulation, such as
exploring the details of abell, and purposivemanipulation
of single objects, such as turning the pages of a picture
book, and moving a bell to generate ringing sounds.
Cognitive triadic scores
The social triadic skills, joint attention and cooperative-
ness, have already been discussed. Cognitive non-social
triadic skills (infant-object-object), which we call com-
plex object-object manipulation, were assessed with 13
BSID items (see Table S4). These items required the
infant to act on an object in relation to, or in a functional
relation with, a second object. Examples of these triadic
items include lifting a cup to reveal a hidden toy and
placing a round block into the circular hole on a form
board.
General cognition
Finally, we retained the MDI score as an index of general
cognition, summarizing the overall performance of an
infant, i.e. their general developmental status. We rea-
soned thatMDI scoresmight not be equivalent to the sum
of the extracted items, although this working hypothesis is
subject to empirical verification in our analyses.
Data analyses
Multilevel trajectory analyses
Our design called for testing chimpanzees eight times, at
monthly intervals between 5 and 12 months of age, but
some tests were missed (Bard & Gardner, 1996). For ST
chimpanzees, the number of months for which scores
were available averaged 5.75 (SD = 2.22, range 2–8),
whereas for RC chimpanzees, the average was 7.96 (SD =
1.22, range 7–8). Accordingly, we estimated trajectory
parameters (slopes, intercepts, confidence intervals) for
this multilevel model (monthly scores for the eight scales
described in the previous section nested within chim-
panzee, with chimpanzees in either the ST or RC group)
with MPLUS, a program that, inter alia, can estimate
parameters for multilevel structural equation models
when the number and timing of repeated observations
varies (Heck & Thomas, 2009; Muthen, 1997; Rauden-
bush & Bryk, 2002).
For each of the eight scales, we proceeded as follows.
To determine whether ST and RC groups differed, first
we fitted a model that constrained slopes (change in
score per month) for the two groups to be identical. This
level of the analysis tells us whether the intercepts for ST
and RC groups differ, and whether the slopes for the
eight scales differ significantly from zero (indicating
significant developmental change). A second model
allowed slopes to differ, in which developmental trajec-
tories in the two chimpanzee groups were compared. A
99% confidence interval was constructed on the resulting
regression lines.
Unlike the longitudinal chimpanzee data, the human
data derived from Bayley (1969) were cross-sectional and
with varying sample sizes (42 to 57). To compare the
human data with the chimpanzee data, we note where the
human scores fall relative to the confidence intervals (CI)
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for the chimpanzee data. Specifically, we regard the
human sample as significantly different from the chim-
panzee groups when the human data fell outside of the
99% CI surrounding the regression lines for the chim-
panzee groups.
Hierarchic multiple regression analyses
One goal of this study was to investigate the role of
different processes in the development of social cogni-
tion. In order to assess the unique contributions of these
developmental processes (i.e. group membership, affect,
cognitive dyadic skills, cognitive triadic skills, and overall
cognitive ability), with respect to predicting joint atten-
tion and predicting cooperativeness in the chimpanzees,
we employed hierarchic multiple regression (Cohen &
Cohen, 1983). In hierarchic multiple regression, the
order in which variables are entered is specified in
advance. In particular, we did not use computer-deter-
mined, data-driven methods that determine order by
proportions of variance accounted for (R2). Here, the
hierarchical order was based on prototypic human
development. Our a priori hypothesis was that previous
engagement experiences (i.e. group membership: ST vs.
RC) and concurrent affect (positive emotional tone and
fearfulness during the test) were predictors of joint
attention and cooperation outcomes, and, thus, these
variables were entered as the first, second, and third
steps, respectively. By entering these variables first, their
effects were controlled in subsequent steps investigating
the independent effects of cognitive variables on out-
comes. The remaining order was predetermined, entering
cognitive dyadic skills, cognitive triadic skills, and
general cognition in that order. For the dyadic and
triadic skills, social skills were added before the object
skills because social skills typically occur earlier in
development (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). The hierar-
chical nature of the analysis meant that the unique
contribution of each variable was determined, above and
beyond the variables already in the model (i.e. the
reported statistic was change in the proportion of
variance accounted for, DR2, at each step). Effects on
outcome of variables entered later in the model statis-
tically controlled for variables entered earlier.
To determine the effect of engagement history, the
outcome variable (either joint attention or cooperative-
ness) was regressed first on a coded variable for group
(step 1). A significant DR2 at this first step would mean
that being raised in RC or ST, in itself, was predictive of
social cognition outcomes. Positive emotional tone was
added in step 2 and fearfulness, the other affect scale,
was added in step 3. Affect scores were added before oth-
ers because of affect’s early occurrence in development
(Adamson & Bakeman, 1985; Trevarthen & Aitken,
2001), and our theoretical position that affect is critically
important in the development of primate social cogni-
tion. We predicted that previous engagement history
(Group) and concurrent emotion (Affect) would be
important predictors of both joint attention and coop-
eration outcomes, i.e. if so, then these first three steps
would account for a large proportion of unique R2. The
following analyses, thus, will test these theoretical
predictions: The Lived Experiences model will be
rejected if significant DR2 is not associated with previous
experience and affect.
With previous experience and concurrent affect con-
trolled, we entered a series of variables that collectively
measured infant cognition. The cognitive dyadic skills
were added; specifically, dyadic social skill and dyadic
object manipulation skill were steps 4 and 5, respectively.
A significant DR2 would indicate that the infant’s dyadic
cognitive skills, after controlling for engagement experi-
ences and affect, were important in predicting joint
attention skills or cooperation. The cognitive triadic
social skill scales were added in step 6 (i.e. either
cooperativeness when joint attention was the outcome
or joint attention when cooperativeness was the out-
come) and triadic object-object manipulation skills in
step 7. A significant DR2 at these steps would indicate
that infants’ triadic skills were important in predicting
JA or cooperation, after controlling for engagement
experiences, affect, and dyadic skills. According to the
Shared Intentionality model, cooperation underpins
joint attention in humans, and therefore, this aspect of
their theoretical model was explored here. This aspect of
their model would be rejected for chimpanzees if a
significant DR2 were not found at step 6. The final step
added was general cognition, i.e. the MDI score. A
significant DR2 at this final step would indicate that
general intelligence, above and beyond all the other
variables, uniquely predicted the social cognition
outcome.
The design of the study called for the chimpanzees to
be assessed eight times, at monthly intervals from 5 to
12 months. The goal of the hierarchic multiple regression
analyses was to ascertain those processes that underlie
the development of joint attention and those that
underlie the development of cooperation. Developmen-
tal change in the foundational skills and in the joint
attention and cooperation outcomes was expected.
However, conducting hierarchic multiple regression
analyses at each age was inadvisable, due to the relatively
small sample size and the relatively large number of
analyses that would result. If there was no developmental
change, then variables could be averaged over the
8 months, and a single hierarchic multiple regression
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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analysis could be conducted for each outcome. However,
preliminary analyses suggested significant developmental
change in many of the variables (Figures S1–S6).
Accordingly, we conducted two hierarchic multiple
regression analyses for each outcome, first using vari-
ables averaged across the first four months (i.e. from 5 to
8 months, inclusive), and second, using variables aver-
aged across the last 4 months (i.e. from 9 to 12 months,
inclusive). Thus, we could determine whether the under-
lying processes contributing to joint attention and those
contributing to cooperation were different during the
earlier and later developmental periods of the study.
Results
Joint attention success
Both groups of nursery chimpanzees were significantly
more successful in joint attention (JA) than the human
infants, at 5, 6, and 7 months of age (Figure 2: ps < .01).
The chimpanzee groups were successful in JA at an
earlier age than the human infants: Chimpanzees were
less than 5 months and humans were 6 months when
they passed the first JA item. Human JA success was
significantly lower than the Responsive Care (RC)
chimpanzees at 8 and 9 months (ps < .01). Human
infants were significantly more successful in JA than
both chimpanzee groups from 10 through 12 months of
age (ps < .01). The developmental trajectory of JA
success increased significantly in all groups (ps < .001),
but it was steeper for humans (b = 1.71) than for the
chimpanzee groups (ST b = 0.51; RC b = 0.51). JA
success was significantly higher in RC chimpanzees,
given enriched engagement experiences, than in Standard
Care (ST) chimpanzees with essentially no overlap in
99% confidence intervals, and significantly different
intercepts.
Two hierarchic multiple regressions were conducted to
determine the unique contribution of foundational
variables to Joint Attention (JA: Table 1). In predicting
JA at the younger age period (5–8 months), a significant
DR2 of 19% was found for previous engagement expe-
riences (i.e. group), and a significant DR2 of 13% also
was found for Affect (fearfulness). In predicting JA at
the older age period (9–12 months), a significant DR2 of
8% was found for previous experiences (i.e. group), and a
significant unique DR2 of 24% was found for Affect
(positive emotional tone). In terms of cognitive predic-
tors, a significant DR2 was found for dyadic social skills
at both age periods, 13% and 9%, respectively, above and
beyond the variance accounted for by previous experi-
ence and affect. In predicting JA at the younger age, but
not the older age, a significant DR2 of 6% was found for
dyadic object manipulation skill, after controlling for
group, affect, and dyadic social skills. Triadic skills
(cooperativeness and complex object-object manipula-
tion skills) did not make a significant unique contribu-
tion at either age period, after controlling for
engagement history, affect, and dyadic skills. General
cognition accounted for significant DR2 of 12%, only at
the younger age period, after controlling for all other
variables. The variables as a set accounted for 66% and
43% of joint attention variance at younger and older
ages, respectively (59% and 31% when adjusted for the
sample size and number of predictors). The full model
was significant at both younger and older ages, F(8, 36) =
8.84, p < .001, and F(8, 38) = 3.62, p = .003, respectively.
Cooperation
Cooperativeness scores for the human infants were
within the 99% confidence interval of RC chimpanzees
except at 12 months, when human scores fell just below
the lower 99% boundary for RC, and just above the
upper 99% boundary for ST chimpanzees (Figure 3).
Cooperativeness was significantly higher in RC than ST
chimpanzees (significantly different intercepts, p < .001).
In humans and ST chimpanzees, the developmental
trajectory of cooperativeness was flat (b = 0.02, b = 0.06,
respectively), but it increased in RC chimpanzees
(b = 0.24). The developmental trajectory in cooperative-
ness of RC chimpanzees was steeper than that of ST
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Figure 2 Joint Attention Developmental Trajectories. The
average number of joint attention items passed (JA Success
indicated by symbols), developmental trajectories (slope of
change with age, shown in solid lines) and 99% confidence
intervals (dashed lines) are shown for 28 Standard Care (in
blue) and 17 Responsive Care (in red) chimpanzees, and for
human norms (in black) tested from 5 months to 12 months of
age.
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chimpanzees, approaching but not reaching statistical
significance (p = .058).
The hierarchic multiple regression analyses showed
that previous engagement experiences (group) accounted
for significant DR2 of 14% and 21% at the younger and
older ages, respectively (Table 1). Positive emotional
tone made unique contributions to cooperativeness at
both developmental periods, accounting for significant
DR2 of 62% and 33%, respectively, above and beyond the
variance accounted for by group membership. At the
younger age period, but not the older age period,
fearfulness and cognitive dyadic object skills accounted
for significant, but small, increases in R2 of 2% and 4%,
respectively. Neither type of triadic skill nor general
cognition contributed to cooperativeness, after control-
ling for engagement history, affect, and dyadic skills. The
variables as a set accounted for 83% and 60% of
cooperativeness variance (79% and 52%, when adjusted
for the sample size and number of predictors), for the
younger and older developmental periods, respectively.
The full model was significant at both younger and older
ages, F(8, 36) = 21.82, p < .001, and F(8, 38) = 7.16,
p < .001, respectively.
Joint attention–cooperation link
The hierarchic multiple regression analyses revealed that
JA and cooperation were not empirically associated in
the chimpanzees at 5–8 months or at 9–12 months, after
statistically controlling for the effects of engagement
history, affect, and dyadic skills. Although significant
bivariate correlations between JA and cooperativeness
occurred (r = .31 and .49, p = .04 and < .01, at the
younger and older ages, respectively), the direct associ-
ation disappeared when variables entered earlier in the
regressions were taken into account. Both social
cognition outcomes were related significantly to engage-
ment experiences and to affect. In chimpanzee infants,
the link between cooperation and joint attention
success, at both age periods, was fully explained by
previous engagement experiences, affect, and dyadic
social skills.
Table 1 Predicting joint attention and cooperativeness in nursery-raised chimpanzees with hierarchic multiple regressions
Step Predictor variable
DR2 b
Joint attention Cooperativeness Joint attention Cooperativeness
5–8 mo 9–12 mo 5–8 mo 9–12 mo 5–8 mo 9–12 mo 5–8 mo 9–12 mo
1 Group (engagement history) 19** 8* 14* 21** .43** .29* .38* .46**
2 Positive emotional tone 0.2 24** 62** 33** .05 .57** .92** .67**
3 Fearfulness 13** 1 2* ~0 –.89** .21 –.38* .03
4 Dyadic social skill 13** 9* 0.3 2 .44** .38* .06 .17
5 Object manipulation skill 6* ~0 4** 2 .42* .02 .33** .24
6 Triadic social skill ~0 0.4 ~0 0.3 –.04 .09 –.02 .07
7 Object-object manipulation 3 0.6 ~0 2 .24 .10 .00 .17
8 General cognition 12** 0.5 0.1 0.1 .87** .13 .11 –.05
Total R2 66 43 83 60 — — — —
Adjusted R2 59 31 79 52 — — — —
Note: N = 45 at 5–8 months and N = 47 at 9–12 months. Statistics for steps 1–8 are proportion of additional unique variance accounted for expressed
as a percentage (DR2) and the regression coefficient (b) when each variable is added to the equation, from a hierarchic multiple regression with order of
entry specified as shown. Total R2 and total R2 adjusted for number of variables and sample size are likewise expressed as percentages. Significant DR2
and b are indicated with bold; *p < .05; **p < .01.
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Figure 3 Cooperativeness Developmental Trajectories.
Cooperativeness mean scores (symbols), developmental
trajectory (solid lines) and 99% confidence intervals (dashed
lines) are shown for 28 standard care chimpanzees
(in blue), 17 responsive care chimpanzees (in red), and 42–57
human infants (in black) tested from 5 months to 12 months of
age.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Affect and chimpanzee social cognition 9
There was not a strong association between the
development of joint attention and cooperation in young
human infants, since the developmental trajectories of
JA and cooperativeness differed dramatically. For the
human infants, their steeply rising joint attention trajec-
tory (b = 1.71) was not accompanied or matched by any
developmental change in cooperativeness, which had a
flat slope (b = 0.02). For the human infants, flat devel-
opmental trajectories were found in affect (Figures S1
and S2) and general cognition (Figure S6). Rising slopes
were found for three aspects of cognitive development:
both types of dyadic skills (Figures S3 and S4), and non-
social triadic skills (Figure S5). If JA and cooperation
were interdependent across development, then the sharp
increases in JA skills would be matched by similar
developmental changes in cooperation, which was not
found. It is possible, of course, that a direct link exists,
but only in older children, or that only a minimal level of
cooperation is required to support joint attention.
However, note that by 12 months, the RC chimpanzees
excelled in cooperation compared to the humans, but the
RC chimpanzees did not excel in joint attention,
suggesting that enhanced cooperation does not lead
directly to enhanced JA.
Discussion
Our results were strongly consistent with the Lived Expe-
riences model: social cognition outcomes differed within
chimpanzees based on their previous engagement experi-
ences; there was substantial comparability in the social
cognition outcomes of chimpanzee infants and human
infants in the first year of life; social cognition outcomes in
thechimpanzees showedsignificantdevelopmental change
from 5 to 12 months of age; and, most importantly, both
concurrent emotional engagement and previous engage-
ment experiences were foundational for social cognition
outcomes in young chimpanzees. The Lived Experiences
model, a human-based model of developmental processes
leading toshared intentionality,wasapplied successfully to
chimpanzees. Thus, our findings lend support to claims of
evolutionary continuity in developmental processes that
subserve social cognition (Bard, 2009; Boesch, 2012;
Gardner, 2005; Gomez, 2005; Hopkins, Russell & Schaef-
fer, 2012; Jablonka & Lamb, 2007).
We found a spurt in joint attention success in the
human infants from 10 months of age that was not
matched by the chimpanzees, providing support for a
quantitative difference between laboratory-raised chim-
panzee infants and typically developing US infants. It is
unclear whether this difference is attributable to: (a) the
limits of the institutional settings of the chimpanzees; or
(b) psychological limits in chimpanzees. Because joint
attention success in these laboratory chimpanzee infants
was systematically malleable in the presence of differen-
tial engagement experiences (see below), we suggest that
the former possibility is more likely. Group differences in
joint attention success cannot be attributed to length of
postnatal experiences or different types of assessment,
because all participants were given the same test, with
the same durations of postnatal experience (i.e. at the
same chronological ages).
We cannot confirm species differences in JA success,
however, because the human and chimpanzee groups
differed systematically in the quality of postnatal engage-
ment experiences: the human infants were raised in dual-
parent-family homes in the US (Bayley, 1969), and the
chimpanzee infants were raised primarily in peer-group
nurseries, under institutional conditions of a biomedical
laboratory, which are known to impact negatively on
cognition (Leavens & Bard, 2011; Lyn et al., 2010;
Rumbaugh et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2011). Of particular
importance, are the differences in attachment relations:
The majority of US infants in the 1950s had a functioning
attachment relationship (with 65% secure attachments),
whereas the majority of the nursery-reared chimpanzees
exhibited disorganized attachment (at levels similar to
those of human infants raised in the worst of orphanages:
van IJzendoorn, Bard, Bakermans-Kranenburg & Ivan,
2009). Ape infants and ape adults with non-institutional,
enriched experiences exhibit significantly greater compe-
tencies (Bania et al., 2009; Fouts, 1997; Furlong et al.,
2008; Menzel, Davenport & Rogers, 1970; Savage-Rumb-
augh et al., 1993), suggesting that institutionalized rearing
inhibits social cognition in apes, as it does in humans
(Brune, Brune-Cohrs, McGrew & Preuschoft, 2006;
Kalcher et al., 2008; Kaler & Freeman, 1994; Leavens &
Bard, 2011; Fox et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2007; Rutter
et al., 2010). In other studies with engagement histories
more closely matched than was possible here, human
infants, even at 2.5 years of age, did not excel in social
cognition relative to apes (Russell et al., 2011). The Lived
Experiences model is useful in explaining this range of
phenotypic variation in joint attention as a function of
engagement history.
We found that cooperation in the human infants did not
show improvement across early development. The give-
and-take exchanges that defined cooperativeness here
were shown to be typical for young human and chimpan-
zee infants; however, it should be acknowledged that
cooperation can continue to develop into collaboration in
children and human adults (e.g. Hamann et al., 2011),
with some outcomes unparalleled in any other primate
(Whiten& van Schaik, 2007). Ontogeny and years of post-
toddler interactional experiences are crucially important
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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for human infants to become collaborators and inten-
tional beings (Racine & Carpendale, 2007; Tomasello &
Moll, 2010). However, the results reported here strongly
support the conclusion that postnatal experiences during
early development are proximate mechanisms supporting
the development of cooperation, intentionality, and
intersubjectivity in apes, as well as in humans (Bakeman
et al., 1990; Bard, 2012; Boesch, 2012; de Waal & Ferrari,
2010; Fouts, 1997; Hayes, 1951; Henrich, Heine &
Norenzayan, 2010; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933; Leavens
et al., 2010; Lillard, 1998; Papousek, 2007; Trevarthen &
Aitken, 2001; Watson, 1972).
An enriched engagement history, even within an
otherwise austere institutional setting, significantly
enhanced both joint attention and cooperation in the
chimpanzee infants. Experiences of nurturing were
presented here (Figure 1) to illustrate one type of
engagement experience that differed significantly for
chimpanzee infants raised in a standard care (ST)
nursery versus a responsive care (RC) nursery. There
were two major routes through which engagement
experience impacted social cognition, directly (the nurs-
ery group variable reflects the totality of their different
engagement experiences) and indirectly, via changing
infants’ affective states during the test. Affect during the
test was not only a significant factor in both social
cognition outcomes, above and beyond group experi-
ences, but also a very meaningful factor (i.e. accounting
for large percentages of unique variance: 13% and 24% in
joint attention, and 62% and 33% in cooperation across
the two age periods). Affect, both positive emotional
engagement and lack of fearfulness, were concurrent
measures of the infants’ emotional engagement with the
test-taking task. Interestingly, it was previous experience
that primarily predicted JA at the younger ages, and
primarily positive emotional tone that predicted JA at
the older ages. We conclude that a major aspect of the
application of a Lived Experiences model to chimpanzee
development is supported, because previous engagement
experiences and concurrent emotional engagement were
significant and unique variables in the development of
social cognition for young chimpanzees.
We found that cognition was also an important
predictor for joint attention. According to developmen-
tal principles, poor social cognition could occur due to
infants’ (1) poor social skills, since both joint attention
and cooperation require a strong foundation of engage-
ment with a social partner; (2) poor object manipulation
skills, since joint attention assessed here required objects
to be manipulated in particular ways; (3) poor ability to
form triadic relations, since cooperation and joint
attention were both defined by the triangle of infant-
object-social partner; or (4) a general cognitive deficit.
We considered these four different aspects of cognition
separately in order to be more specific about their
influences. The significant hierarchic multiple regression
models for joint attention and cooperation included all
these developmentally assessed cognitive skills, after
controlling for engagement history and affect. At the
younger age of 5–8 months, the sum of all the cognitive
skills accounted for 34% of the variance in JA success
(approximately equal to the combined effects of previous
experience and concurrent affect), and at the older age of
9–12 months, the sum of all the cognitive skills
accounted for 11% of the variance (much less than the
32% of the variance accounted for by previous experi-
ence and concurrent affect). These analyses extend our
knowledge of how infants develop social cognition by
highlighting dyadic, rather than triadic, skills as under-
pinning JA especially, but also Cooperation, to a lesser
extent. Based on our findings, we suggest that the
developmental processes that subserve the emergence of
joint attention and cooperation are similar and
conserved in hominoid evolution.
The primacy of engagement experiences and positive
affect in predicting Cooperativeness scores at both
periods contrasts with the range of variables predicting
Joint Attention, suggesting that there may be important
differences in the developmental processes underlying
different types of social cognition, at least in chimpan-
zees. Moreover, the contributions of underlying processes
change across developmental periods, which presents
intriguing challenges for developmental research with
humans as well. Studies exploring the influence of
emotion and previous engagement experiences on devel-
opmental change in social cognition would illuminate
important processes in human infants (Deak et al., 2013;
Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).
The theoretical construct of ‘motivation to share
things with others psychologically’ is proposed by
Tomasello et al. (2005, p. 689) to be a core species-
unique concept of the Shared Intentionality model
(Tomasello & Moll, 2010). Such theoretical constructs
appear speculative, and are difficult to apply in compar-
ative research when operational definitions are lacking
(Deak et al., 2013). One aspect of this sharing construct,
Cooperativeness, is indexed here by the amount and
enjoyment of ‘give-and-take’ between infant and adult.
Prototypic western human infants are proposed to show
joy in sharing, for its own sake (e.g. Carpenter & Call,
2013; Herrmann et al., 2007), although similar behaviors
have been observed in some apes as well (reviewed in
Bard & Leavens, 2009). When matched for duration of
postnatal experience, we found that the species did not
differ in this measure of sharing, nor did they differ in
positive emotional tone during testing (even though their
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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engagement histories differed with a demonstrable
impact on emotional expressions, such as social smiling;
Bard et al., 2011). Emotional and social engagement
histories are undoubtedly important variables of the
‘motivation for sharing’ construct, and our study has
shown that this is empirically true for the ‘give-and-take’
type of sharing in chimpanzees, as measured here. We
suggest that future research could explore the extent to
which engagement history and concurrent emotion are
linked with cooperative motivations in human infants.
Thus, the Lived Experiences model is useful in opera-
tionalizing the theoretical construct of ‘motivation to
share with others psychologically’, which is also impor-
tant in support of future comparative research.
We suggest that joint attention and cooperation
develop within particular eco-cultural settings for human
and chimpanzee infants, and that variation in the
phenotypic expressions of social cognition can be
explained by social learning mechanisms involved in
actual experience (Deak et al., 2013; Rumbaugh et al.,
2008). The within-species variation in early development
is illustrated by the significant differences found between
the two groups of nursery-raised chimpanzees tested here
(Bard, 2012; van IJzendoorn et al., 2009). The extraor-
dinary capabilities for advanced physical and social
cognition displayed by great apes that are raised in
human-like artifactual and emotional landscapes (Lyn
et al., 2010; Rumbaugh et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2011),
combined with the significant group differences in both
joint attention and cooperation among the institution-
alized chimpanzees reported here, lead to the clear
conclusion that great apes’ socio-cognitive skills are
highly influenced by as-yet-poorly-specified features of
engagement experiences (e.g. interactions within their
early rearing environments and emotional engagements),
in addition to cognitive skills. It is important to
emphasize that the immense range in cognitive outcomes
reported for chimpanzees cannot be attributed to purely
genetic factors (Boesch, 2012; Jablonka & Lamb, 2007;
Leavens & Bard, 2011; Rumbaugh et al., 2008). In
applying the Lived Experiences model, we advocate for
the inclusion of the often-ignored variables of emotion,
engagement, learning, early experience, and development
into evolutionary models of primate social cognition.
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